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Abstract  
Through a study of two planning appeals regarding student housing in Edinburgh, this paper 
demonstrates the process by which new policy is effectively created ‘under the radar’, without the 
expected oversight by elected politicians and without the rigour, accountability and democratic 
legitimacy demanded of policy making. The paper highlights tensions between local and central 
government, between efficiency and democracy, and between discretion and rule-based systems. It 
argues that by an excessive use of discretion, Scottish government Reporters do not only interpret 
policies, but, in effect, make them.  
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Democracy and Informal Policy-Making:  
Planning appeals in Scotland 
Tahl Kaminer 
 
Policy making 
Governmental policy-making is expected to be a transparent, public endeavour led by local or central 
government (Dorey, 2005; Reed and Cropf, 2010).1 In contemporary democracies, processes of 
policy-making include consultations with experts, with the public and with key stakeholders. The 
preparation of a key statuary document such as the Local Development Plan (LDP, or Local Plan, LP) 
in British cities, includes extensive consultations with professionals in the relevant fields, 
representative organisations and the public, in-depth scrutiny by elected local councillors and other 
forms of oversight. Yet policy is also made through activities and processes that are not specifically 
designated to do so and are consequently less scrutinised and accountable (Brodkin, 1987-88). Policy 
is also created via policy networks and communities, namely, the negotiations and interactions with 
government by diverse stakeholders and interest groups, or shaped bottom up by ‘street level 
bureaucrats’ in the actual implementation of policy (Dorey, 2005; Richardson and Jordan, 1979). 
Some of these processes are relatively transparent while others are opaque; in some, non-political 
agents are central to steering, shaping or making policy. Within the planning system in Scotland, this 
paper will argue, an informal policy-making process exists in which singular, non-elected experts 
have the power to make policy in defiance of elected and accountable local government and with the 
tacit backing of central government. Informal, because of the manner in which policy is created 
inadvertently through a process designed for a completely different purpose – the formulation of 
quasi-judicial judgements based on policy interpretation.  
 
Planning permissions in Scotland are handled by local authorities’ planning departments and planning 
committees. The person or company seeking permission can appeal a rejection; third parties, such as 
local residents or competing interest groups, cannot. The appeal is handled either by a local review 
board (est. 2009 for simple cases) or by the Planning and Environmental Appeals Division (DPEA) of 
the Scottish Government, which, in effect, delegates the review of the appeal to a Reporter (sections 
47-48 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997).2 The Reporter’s response to the 
appeal is usually the final verdict; Scottish Government rarely recalls permissions after this point, and 
litigation through court is an expensive and lengthy process usually avoided. Local authorities’ 
success rate in appeals demonstrates only the level of agreement or disagreement – it does not expose 
the degree to which local authorities adjust their decision-making processes in order to avoid 
rejection,3 i.e., the capacity of Reporters to shape policies and decision-making indirectly.  
 
Discontent regarding the planning appeals process has been acknowledged in the media, in academic 
studies and in reports. ‘The evidence shows that the planning system is not yet effective in engaging, 
let alone empowering, communities,’ a 2016 report stated (Beveridge, Biberbach and Hamilton, 2016, 
36).4 While a lack of right of appeal for local residents benefits developers at the expense of locals, a 
third party right of appeal would not only threaten and slow development, but allow competing 
interests (e.g. other developers) a say; it would further erode local authorities’ control of the process 
as most contested decisions would be deferred to central planning.5 Nevertheless, a concern arises that 
the final verdict is currently handled by single, non-elected, and only partially accountable Reporters.6 
This paper studies two recent appeals regarding student housing in Edinburgh, in order to bring to 
light the process by which policy is created by Reporters, in effect, through the appeals process.  
 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the miniscule aspects of policies and processes determine 
and control urban development, how democracy can be weakened by discreet power structures within 
state bureaucracy. It will closely interrogate one specific area – the handling of planning appeals by 
Reporters in Scotland – as a means of illustrating the manner in which policy is de facto created 
without the direct involvement of the political sphere. The focus on a specific area such as student 
housing is necessary in order to enable identifying the effects of the appeals on later decisions. The 
selection of student housing as the area of focus was driven by the growing discontent and 
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contestation surrounding such endeavours in many British cities, particularly those with large 
universities, in which growth in universities and their student population has effected local 
communities and triggered a popular backlash. In this sense, the development in Edinburgh of 
purpose-built student housing echoes similar processes elsewhere, hence the significance and 
sensitivity of appeals’ decisions in this field.7  
 
One of the aims of this paper, then, is to expand an already significant literature on veiled power 
structures within bureaucratic frameworks and processes (Richardson and Jordan, 1979). ‘[P]olicy 
making that occurs as a by-product of bureaucratic routine, lower-level coping mechanisms, and 
informal decision rules’, wrote the political scientist Evelyn Brodkin, ‘is difficult to identify 
analytically, much less challenge politically. This, of course, is a virtue in terms of managing political 
conflict over policy’ (Brodkin, 1987-88, 579).  
 
The preparation of the statuary LDP, as mentioned above, includes discussions with multiple 
stakeholders and extended consultations; Reporters, in contrast, and as this paper will show, single-
handedly steer policy through their role in the appeals process. The Reporters rethink and rewrite 
policy according to their interpretation, well beyond the familiar shaping of policy through its 
implementation by ‘street level bureaucrats’ and with only limited consultation.8 It is this 
unscrutinised aspect of the appeals system that this paper will interrogate. The study of appeals in this 
paper will inevitably highlight tensions found throughout the planning system between (1) local and 
central government, (2) efficiency and democracy, and (3) flexibility, enabled through discretion, and 
clarity, typically achieved through rule-based systems.  
 
Identifying the process by which Reporters, in effect, create urban policy, enables a better 
understanding of the power structures that shape the built environment and consequently also provides 
an opportunity to transform and democratise them. Acknowledging that the work of Reporters is a 
policy-making process is merely a first step, which can be followed up either by rethinking the entire 
process in order to increase its legitimacy, democracy and accountability, or, alternatively, by 
curtailing the discretionary powers of the Reporters by limiting appeals to technical issues. Without 
addressing the discreet forms of policy-making in planning, power will remain de-politicised, 
entrenched within the opaque processes and procedures of governance. 
 
Student housing policy 
The key statuary document consulted by city council planners and Reporters is the LDP (section 25 of 
the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997). It is a general document that guides local 
government decisions over 4-5 years, and coalesces local policies regarding housing, retails, public 
space, sustainability, development, communities and more. It mostly avoids specificity: an approach 
that enables tailored and nimble decisions regarding particular cases of development and 
redevelopment over a number of years. The generality of the document, then, is aimed at providing 
discretion and flexibility, which are characteristic of the British planning systems as a whole 
(Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006). The other documents frequently consulted by Reporters include non-
statuary guidelines by local government that elaborate the LDP policies, the Strategic Development 
Plan by Scottish Government and the non-statuary Scottish Planning Policy. These are addressed as 
‘other material considerations’, and their weighting in each case depends on the discretion of the 
planners or Reporter. The argumentation and verdict of Reports emulate legal and quasi-legal 
deliberations and interpretations of law.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
At the centre of this paper’s study of the work of Reporters are two recent planning permission 
applications that were rejected by the City of Edinburgh Council (CEC) but were accepted on appeal. 
Both regard student housing in Edinburgh’s South Side (Figure 1). Local residents in Edinburgh’s Old 
Town and nearby areas such as the South Side have increasingly opposed the recent growth of student 
numbers in their neighbourhoods. The first (2014) of the two appeals regards a proposal for new 
students’ housing in Lutton Place in place of a printers’ workshop and a neoclassical house (Figure 
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2).9 The second (2015) regards the nearby Homebase retail site on St. Leonards (Figure 3). The 
former was proposed by a private developer, the latter by student accommodation specialists UNITE.  
 
The context of the cases includes the growth in student numbers in Edinburgh, the burgeoning 
lucrative market of student accommodation, which in Edinburgh enables high-end holiday-lets during 
the summer festival season, and the attempt by the city council to respond to local concerns through a 
‘social mix’ policy intended to limit student numbers in particular areas. The specific qualities, 
strengths and weaknesses of the CEC’s policy in question, Hou10 in the 2010 Local Plan, are not at 
the centre of this study, nor is the question whether purpose-built student housing ought to be 
supported. What is important, though, is to establish that the policy is not blatantly unreasonable. 
 
Both Reports in question are highly dependent on interpreting the 2010 Local Plan’s policy Hou10. 
The key paragraph of Hou10, which stands for ‘Housing 10’ and outlines the CEC student housing 
policy in general terms, reads as follows: 
 
6.35 Planning permission will be granted for purpose-built student accommodation where: a) 
the location is appropriate in terms of access to public transport and university and college 
facilities; and b) the proposal will not result in an excessive concentration of student 
accommodation in any one locality. (CEC, 2010, 69) 
 
The following point of Hou10, 6.36, describes the growth in the student population and laments the 
effects of this growth on specific parts of the city. It highlights the problem of the loss of family 
homes to Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMOs) for students. Point 6.37 explicitly calls for more 
purpose-built student accommodation, understood as a means of reducing conversion of family 
housing to HMOs. It calls for placing such accommodation in proximity to campuses but qualifies 
this:  
 
In assessing the degree of concentration of student accommodation the Council will take into 
account the nature of the locality in terms of mix of land use and housing types, the existing 
and proposed number of students in the locality and evidence of problems in rapid population 
turnover and less stable communities referred to in paragraph 6.36 above. (CEC, 2010, 70) 
 
The non-statuary supplementary guidance ‘Student Housing’ identified three categories of areas: 1. 
adjacent to or within university campuses; 2. within reasonable reach by walking, cycling or public 
transport; 3. distant areas. It argued that purpose-built student accommodation should not be placed in 
distant areas, suggested that in areas belonging to the second category students’ should not surpass 
30% of the population, whereas in adjacent areas student numbers should be allowed to reach up to a 
maximum of 60%.  
 
The policy exposes the values and assumptions of the CEC; namely, its understanding of public 
interest and ‘the good life’: it infers that a neighbourhood requires a sizable ‘stable’ long-term 
population; it suggests that a ‘good’ social mix consists not only of long-term and short-term 
population, but also of students, as a specific age and social group, and families. An excessive 
presence of students, the policy infers, would undermine such a mix. 
 
Social-mix policies, aimed at achieving what is perceived to be a ‘good’ social balance, are familiar in 
planning, and have been deployed in differing forms by both conservative and progressive local 
governments. Social-mix policies were originally formed in order to curtail the effects of the market 
on the social makeup of neighbourhoods (Rose et al. 2013). Their focus has often been 
socioeconomic, aimed at diversifying a neighbourhood’s class composition. However, the growing 
awareness and concerns regarding other forms of spatial segregation, such as age-based segregation 
and concentrations, have become increasingly prominent in discussions regarding health and well-
being and are likely to become more prominent in forthcoming years in social-mix policies (see 
WHO). Social-mix policies can be criticised from a market-oriented or libertarian perspective as 
strong-handed forms of governance intervening in a territory that ought to be government-free. Yet, as 
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local governments have a limited array of instruments to address spatial segregation, they are 
commonly used – primarily in housing policies, which provide a tacit instrument of achieving the 
desired mix while avoiding political backlash (Musterd and Andersson 2005).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
Student accommodation: Lutton Place  
The CEC sided with the local residents in the Lutton Place case and denied planning permission, 
citing the high concentration of students. The developers appealed, and the case was sent to a 
Reporter. The Reporter in the appeal devoted much of his argumentation to the question of the 
appropriateness of the location for student housing. The Reporter consulted the CEC’s supplementary 
guidance ‘Student Housing’, identified as a material consideration. Here, he points out, ‘Four 
problematic consequences [of growth in student population] are identified: increased HMOs; less 
stable communities; a rapid turnover of population; and properties left vacant for extended periods in 
the summer.’ (PPA-230-2122.18) As purpose-built student accommodation is generally supported in 
the LP and the supplementary guidance, and, according to the speculation in the LP, may even 
alleviate the conversions of family housing to HMOs, the one issue requiring further consideration 
was the concentration of students in the area.  
 
The limited data regarding the number of students and student homes in the area, collated from 
outdated census data and changing data zones, meant that the Reporter could doubt CEC’s argument 
that the area had reached the 60% limit. The Reporter, in fact, suggested that pursuing a precise 
number was not necessary in this case; the high number of students in the area was a reasonable 
conclusion. Yet he belittled the importance of this fact to the consideration of the application: 
 
in carrying out [the] assessment [whether the proposal would result in an excessive 
concentration of student accommodation], regard must be had to the particular circumstances of 
the case and to the objective of the policy as a whole, which is to support purpose-built student 
accommodation in locations which are close to higher education facilities. (PPA-230-2122.23) 
 
Subsequently, the Reporter proceeded to disagree with the CEC, arguing that the area in question 
must be considered ‘adjacent’ (i.e. susceptible to 60%) rather than ‘in reasonable distance’ (i.e. 
susceptible only to 30%). Moreover: purpose-built student housing, the Reporter continued, has to be 
built in areas adjacent to the campuses, no matter how high the student concentration:  
 
It would be illogical if those locations which the policy accepts are most suited to student 
accommodation (those closest to main campuses) were ruled out solely on the basis that they 
were, unsurprisingly, already popular with students. In addition to the important policy 
aspiration to reduce the need for students to travel, there are basic market economic factors to 
consider. If purpose-built student accommodation is to be delivered it must be where students 
want to live and where prospective providers consider there will be strong enough demand to 
make the development viable. A location like the appeal site, which is adjacent to a main 
campus, is in such a location. (PPA-230-2122.25) 
 
This argument is precisely the locus in which policy is inadvertently created. To begin, the Reporter 
expands spatially the area considered ‘adjacent’ to include, in effect, the entire city centre, much 
beyond the intentions of the CEC. Furthermore, the Reporter privileges argument a) in point 6.35 of 
the LP (‘the location is appropriate in terms of access to public transport and university and college 
facilities’) over b) (‘the proposal will not result in an excessive concentration of student 
accommodation in any one locality’). There is no clear reason for such weighting, except for the 
extended focus of points 6.36, 6.37 and the supplementary guidance on issues related to a). The 
Reporter, in effect, diverges from the CEC policy: a significantly larger area than intended is now 
considered ‘adjacent’, and he questions the basic principle of limiting student numbers in ‘adjacent’ 
areas.  
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The Reporter’s argument suggests, then, that caps on student numbers in the most viable areas should 
be invalidated, that there should be no concern for ‘rapid population turnover and less stable 
communities’ (CEC, 2010, 70). This provides an original re-reading of the LP and its intentions, quite 
removed from the original intentions of CEC, it would seem. When the Reporter writes ‘I conclude 
that the proposal would not result in an excessive concentration of student accommodation in the 
locality’ (PPA-230-2122.26), he merely states what has become self-evident, following his earlier 
conclusion that there can be no such thing as ‘excessive concentration’ in areas adjacent to campuses.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 
Student accommodation: St. Leonards 
The second appeal in question regards another site in Edinburgh’s South Side, a proposed 
development by UNITE on the grounds of a Homebase store. The main objection of locals was that 
the student housing would be detrimental to the neighbourhood by increasing the number of short-
term residents in the area. CEC accepted these concerns and refused permission; the developers 
appealed. This appeal was considered in 2015, after the issuing of the Report in the Lutton Place case. 
The latter was consulted in the process, and the main questions the Reporter addressed here were no 
different: the appropriateness of the development to the area and the concern for excessive 
concentration of students in the neighbourhood (PPA-230-2146.1).  
 
The site is adjacent to the university campus, the Reporter concurred with the Lutton Place Report, 
therefore the area is acceptable for students accounting for up to 60% of the local population. The 
Reporter disagreed with the CEC claim that the current percentage should be considered to be 55%, 
and argued that a more adequate number is around 50%. ‘Policy Hou10 positively encourages the 
provision of further purpose-accommodation,’ she wrote, ‘because, as the SG [Supplementary 
Guidance ‘Student Housing’] states, there is a need for more purpose-built student housing […] 
Generally, higher densities are welcomed provided that they are satisfactorily integrated into 
surrounding areas’ (PPA-230-2146.16). The Reporter questioned the alleged relation between growth 
in purpose-built student accommodation and reduction in student numbers in HMOs, but nevertheless 
underlined the perceived benefits of purpose-built student accommodation: (1) reducing the number 
of homes converted to HMOs; (2) ‘managed’ schemes prevent the detrimental effect of students living 
in an area through provision of on-site facilities and control of students’ behaviour; (3) students’ 
presence has a positive impact by contributing to the local economy.  
 
The main argument of the Report in favour of the student accommodation rests on the idea that a 
‘managed’ scheme will prevent the negative consequences of growth in student population. It 
demonstrates a very limited understanding of the effect in question, focused primarily on forms of 
‘anti-social’ behaviour. Invisible to the Reporter are many other potential effects once the social 
composition is significantly altered and age diversity reduced: change of local retailers in response to 
students’ needs at the expense of other age and social groups; limited ability of an area to sustain local 
services and amenities for children and elderly; increasing role of night economy in the area and so 
on. All these long-term effects of population change remain moot in the Report. All locals receive is 
commiseration: 
 
I have some sympathy for those long term residents who are seeing their former family 
orientated communities diminishing, particularly in the falling numbers of young children in 
the area, but this is the result of changing trends in occupation and not solely the result of 
university expansion. In the future, it is highly likely that those same families will be looking 
for secure accommodation for their children when they reach further education stage, at which 
time well managed accommodation like that proposed may well be the only type available. 
(PPA-230-2146.37) 
 
Echoing the Lutton Place Report, here too the LP demand that ‘the proposal will not result in an 
excessive concentration of student accommodation in any one locality’ (CEC, 2010, p. 69) was 
overruled. And while the two Reports offered arguments to support this verdict, they raise the 
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question whether, according to the logic of the argumentation in either, a moment of student 
saturation can be reached, a level of concentration that could be recognised as ‘excessive’, and would 
require refusal of permission. The ‘need’ for student accommodation, the ‘trend’ of purpose-built 
student housing, the ‘laws’ of the market and the consequences of the growth of student population, 
are all accepted as a force majeure, while the LP policy is side-lined.  
 
Adapting policies  
The battles surrounding these developments involved not only local residents but also the local MP 
Sheila Gilmore, the University of Edinburgh, and the local MSP Marco Biagi, the minister at the time 
for the apt and relevant Local Government and Community Empowerment. Biagi called the St. 
Leonards’ Report a ‘novel interpretation’, whereas a local resident commented that ‘The decision all 
hinged on the interpretation of words, and what an excessive concentration of students is. The reporter 
is just playing with words.’ (Nicolson, 2014) MSP Sarah Boyack, reacting to the decision regarding 
the St. Leonards case, commented that ‘[u]nless the council’s approach to assessing these applications 
is updated, I’m concerned we will see more decisions overturned in future. The council recently 
consulted on this issue and that process must lead to clearer, more effective guidance’ (EN, 2015).  
 
The Reports were, to some extent, an ‘interpretation of words’, as the local resident had commented. 
In its decision to deny permission, the CEC interpreted the document it had itself created, the 2010 
LP, in a manner that appears consistent with it. In contrast, the two Reporters could nevertheless 
produce their own interpretation of the intentions of the policies. While the LP is a statuary document, 
its generality and other ‘material considerations’ allowed discretion, in effect enabling central 
government to bypass the LP. In the cases outlined above, CEC remained bound to the LP whereas 
the Reporters exercised their discretion, upending local government’s policy in the process.  
 
As the LDP/LP is prepared and implemented by the same body, CEC in these cases, one form of 
necessary oversight is the Reporter, providing checks and balances. In many countries appeals are 
handled by independent bodies to ensure separation of legislative from administrative powers. Such 
bodies are usually limited to reviewing appeals based on technical shortcomings of the local 
government process – they cannot question the content of local government decisions if the 
procedures and protocols were properly followed in the process - they cannot rethink policy.  
 
So far, the focus of this paper has been on the Reports themselves and consequently their 
argumentation and relation to the policies and decisions applied to specific cases. This paper, 
however, argues that such decisions by Reporters go beyond producing judgement in the cases in 
question and have significant and long-lasting affect on local government planning policies and 
decisions. A 2016 study suggests that Reports are being used by central government as a means of 
enforcing its own policies and priorities, particularly regarding housing provision: ‘There are 
particular concerns about Reporters attempting to address a deficit in housing land late in the plan 
[Sic.] process without the benefit of further local community involvement,’ the study commented 
(Beveridge et al., 2016, p. 9). 
 
DPEA publishes the statistics of success and failure of local councils in appeals, a ‘naming and 
shaming’ that places pressure on local planning departments and committees to improve their success 
rate. Local planning departments carry out their own internal reviews – quarterly reviews in the case 
of CEC. These mechanisms pressurise local government to align its policies and decision-making 
with the findings of Reporters. In an internal briefing document assessing the success rate in appeals 
for April-June 2015, the CEC Planning Department announced that ‘[t]he most significant decision 
[in the period] is the student housing in St Leonard’s and the policy framework is being reviewed on 
this matter. Other than that the cases are small scale and no policy or guideline changes are 
necessary.’ (CEC 2015b, 1; my emphasis) Hence, policy is adjusted as a response to Reports; policy is 
not merely interpreted or elucidated by Reporters; it is made.  
 
In April 2015, a planning application notice was made to the CEC for a mixed development at King’s 
Stables in Edinburgh’s Old Town. The site was a former transport depot. A complex of diverse 
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structures in different states of maintenance and upkeep surrounding a courtyard, King’s Stables was 
identified a few years earlier as a potential site for a ‘cultural quarter’. But as the plan gravitated from 
vision to proposition, the cultural quarter turned into an all-too-familiar complex including a hotel and 
student housing and a limited number of affordable homes unsuitable for families, to the ire of local 
residents. An initial response by the Development Management Sub-Committee of the CEC dated 20 
May 2015 stated that: 
 
The proposal should be accompanied by a planning statement justifying the sustainability of the 
location for student housing having regard to the current concentration of student population in 
the area, student accommodation either completed, under construction, pending determination 
or in the pre-application process and any changes to the non-statuary guidance. 
(15/01938/PAN, 4) 
 
In the consultation carried out over summer 2015 by Scott Hobbs Planning for the developer, local 
residents raised concerns ‘over the need for more student accommodation in Edinburgh as many 
believe there to be enough within the area.’ (Scott Hobbs Planning, 2015a, 5) The planning 
application, submitted in December 2015, proposed a 245 bedroom student accommodation, a 128 
bedroom hotel, food & beverage, an arts facility, and 28 flats, of which 20 were studio or one 
bedroom suitable for students and singles rather than families (Scott Hobbs Planning, 2015b).  
 
The Planning Statement by Scott Hobbs Planning quotes from a letter received from the CEC dated 
25 June 2015: ‘in principal (sic) the proposed mix is acceptable; […] student accommodation is 
supported on sites adjacent to identified campuses and the site is suitably adjacent to the Edinburgh 
College of Art […]’ (Scott Hobbs Planning, 2015b, 13). The CEC, it seems, decided to overlook 
argument b) of its own policy – the CEC letter was issued after the Reports of the appeal cases 
discussed above were published. 
 
Acknowledgement is made in further documents of the local residents’ concerns regarding the 
concentration of students. The Development Management Sub Committee highlighted in the report of 
its 1 July 2016 meeting the ‘overproduction of student accommodation’ (15/05716/CON, 5) in public 
comments to the development. Hou10 is addressed in yet another committee report, and this time the 
losses at previous appeals are shown to shape the decision in the King’s Stables case: 
 
The proposal would increase the concentration of students in the immediate area from 32.89% 
to 36.78% (41.03% to 42.79% if the whole Grassmarket is included). However, two appeal 
decisions (Lutton Place and St Leonard's Street) deemed ‘adjacent’ to a main campus to be a 
short walk of 10 to 12 minutes. Using this interpretation the site is adjacent to a campus and 
does not need satisfy the 30% concentration threshold. On this basis, the concentration is 
acceptable in this locality. (15/05715/FUL, 9) 
 
This time, the CEC did not side with the locals. The Development Committee voted for the King’s 
Stable redevelopment by 11 votes to 3 on July 1st 2016, avoiding another potentially humiliating 
defeat in appeals.  
 
Another case, unrelated to student housing, can provide further evidence of the wide influence of 
Reports. In 2014, CEC Planning Committee considered a planning permission application for an Aldi 
store and housing development on Baileyfield, a contested former site of Scottish Power in 
Edinburgh’s Portobello. Local residents, who had already blocked proposals for a supermarket and for 
high-density housing on this site, had taken part in 2008 in a series of consultations that led to the 
creation of the (non-statuary) ‘North West Portobello Development Brief’, a document which clearly 
stated that retail in the area would be limited to a corner shop. This document was a material 
consideration in the discussions.10 A second document consulted in the process was a Report 
regarding an unrelated case, concerning a site outside Portobello, from 2012. This Report included a 
comment suggesting that the Portobello site in question, Baileyfield, was suitable for locating a store:  
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The former Scottish Power site in Portobello High Street is approximately 200 metres from the 
defined town centre boundary from where it is clearly visible. I consider this site is sufficiently 
close to the centre that it could form an effective extension to it. It is therefore within category 
b in structure plan Policy RET 1 and is sequentially preferable to the appeal site [as a location 
for a supermarket]. (PPA-230-2055.20) 
 
The Reporter’s comment was given more weight by the CEC planners than the ‘North West 
Portobello Development Brief’. In effect, the Report on an unrelated case shaped the outcome of the 
conflict on this particular site: planning permission was given to the developers. It demonstrates the 
manner in which a Report shapes development and redevelopment beyond the limits of the specific 
appeals case in which it was issued.  
 
Discretion, power and accountability 
The turn, decades ago, from public inquiries to written submissions, the deployment of single 
Reporters rather than teams or committees, the absence of lengthy consultations, the recruitment as 
Reporters of ‘freelancers’, the ability to bypass rules and policies in unforeseen circumstances thanks 
to discretion: all these highlight the importance of efficiency to the appeals system. Andy Inch has 
shown (2018, 1085) how the ‘streamlining of process and speeding up of plans and decisions’ has 
been central to planning reform in Scotland. Efficiency, though, does not support democratisation or 
justice; more often, ‘efficiency’ means less participation and less democracy (Brodkin, 1988, 578). 
Inch wrote that: 
 
since the onset of recession and the election of a Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) 
administration ‘sustainable economic growth’ has been further prioritised as the overarching 
purpose of the planning system […]. The hegemonic position of pro-growth planning means 
that development is effectively synonymous with the public interest, the primary good that the 
planning system should seek to promote. This suggests that participation is subordinate to the 
goal of pursuing light touch planning and ensuring that any perceived ‘costs of delay’ in 
decision-making are minimised in the interests of development and growth. (Inch, 2015, 411) 
 
‘Efficiency’, then, is necessarily pitted against democratisation. As a positive technical term, it 
facilitates a political agenda, veiled as an apolitical technical endeavour. An ambition by central 
government to curtail planning and empower, in effect, developers, is furthered by an increased focus 
on efficiency while bypassing inconvenient political debate.   
 
The authority or manager that delegates to an ‘unbiased agent’ often selects a ‘clone’, an agent that 
replicates their own position and values (Montagnes and Wolton, 2017, 458-459). This enables central 
government to obtain the results it requires while distancing itself from unpopular decisions by 
Reporters. The delegation to Reporters means depoliticisation; while on the local level, a permission 
application progresses from a technical sphere (Planning Department) to political (Planning or 
Development Management Committee or Subcommittee, on which elected Councillors sit), in central 
government the appeals process is the reverse – the delegation to ‘technical’ Reporters depoliticises. 
This changes the terms of the contestation and ‘contains’ the conflict. 
 
The Reporter’s ability to make policy stems from the discretion of the Scottish planning system. 
Discretion allows flexibility in the implementation of laws and policies, allows a tailored response to 
specific conditions where rigid rules can fail to serve public interest, can create unforeseen results that 
counter the law or policy’s original intentions. The delegation of decisions to a Reporter and reliance 
on discretion rather than rule is considered ex-post, in the sense of the uncertainty it produces within a 
system as a result of the late emergence of key decisions in the process. In contrast, a rule-based 
system is ex-ante, as the major decisions had been made in advance (Montagnes and Wolton, 2017, 
457).  
 
Discretion can be identified in law and policy making as well as in the interpretation of rules, laws 
and facts. The former process (law and policy making) is presumed to be the realm of politics, and the 
10	
	
latter (the interpretation of rules) the realm of courts, administration and others (MacCarthaigh, 2011, 
678-79). Local government planners can be considered ‘street level bureaucrats’ whereas Reporters 
are ‘independent regulatory agents’. While the latter’s work should be considered the interpretation of 
rules, laws, facts and policies, it extends inadvertently into the territory of policy making, the process 
elected public representatives are expected to lead. Hence, the appeals system leads to what has been 
called ‘policy politics’ (Wildavsky, 1967), which is here a territory of informal policy-making.  
 
In the often tense relationship between central and local government, ultimate power in Britain resides 
in central government. In this sense, the power of Reporters over local government reflects these 
conditions, and the Reports amount to an informal pressure on local government exercised somewhat 
indirectly by central government. The exercising of discretion empowers Reporters to do more than 
merely curtail the excesses of power of local government, more than demand clear process, 
accountability, and coherence from local government. Reporters can question, contradict, and, in 
effect, bypass the policies of local government. Reporters pressurise local government to adapt 
policies in accordance with their findings, argumentations and verdicts.  
 
Reporters are part of a system of checks and balances exercised by central government, but to what 
extent and to whom are the Reporters accountable? Reporters are accountable to central government 
that nominates them; their decisions receive media scrutiny only in cases of wide public interest. 
Accountability, therefore, is relatively limited. While the local government processes of creating the 
LDP and discussing planning permissions are relatively transparent and public endeavours, the work 
of the Reporter is relatively opaque and problematically a one-person effort. Policy-shaping by a 
single expert is professionally and democratically deficient. 
 
The limited accountability of the Reporter relatively to local government planning committees or 
planners, means the Reporter can deploy discretionary powers in a more radical sense than others 
within the planning system. ‘[T]he capacity of administrative agencies to shape policy,’ wrote Bodkin 
(1988, 582), ‘depends on the extent to which they exercise discretion over policy delivery’. This 
ability is enhanced by the power vested in a decision made by a singular expert rather than a team or 
committee, bypassing negotiations, deliberations and compromises typical of juries and committees. 
Consequently, Reporters seem to exercise their discretion more often and more radically than other 
agents within the planning system who, in principle at least, command similar discretionary powers 
but are pressurised to avoid divergence from existing policies.  
 
The current appeals system, then, lacks transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy. The 
problems identified here exist also in the English planning system, which has very similar policies and 
processes. Consequently, while the cases discussed here are specific to Scottish Planning, the issues 
they raise are not restricted to local concerns. The two main alternatives to rectify the appeals system 
without a radical overhaul of the entire planning system would be either to curtail the discretionary 
powers of Reporters, for example by limiting appeals to technical issues, or to add accountability and 
increase the voices involved in decision making. Without change, the appeals system will continue to 
overrule local concerns and increase the democratic deficit, citizens’ discontent, and local 
government’s timidity and paralysis.  
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Notes 
 
1 While these presumptions are particularly visible in the ‘policy cycle’ model (see Reed and Cropf 
2010), they are present, whether overtly or covertly, in all policy-making models with the exception 
of those focused on the irrational aspects of the process, such as John Kingdon’s ‘garbage can’ model. 
2 New legislation is altering some of these processes, though the overall structure will remain similar. 
See http://www.parliament.scot/Planning%20(Scotland)%20Bill/SPBill23S052017.pdf  (accessed 15 
December 2017). 
3 For example, 38% success rate in delegated appeals for City of Edinburgh Council in 2016/17 
compared to 62% for 2014/15 (CEC, 2015a; Planning and Environmental Appeals Division, 2017). 
4	See also civil society campaign groups such as Planning Democracy: 
<<http://www.planningdemocracy.org.uk/>> (accessed 23rd August 2018). 
5 Third parties in many countries have a right of appeal. In the Republic of Ireland, for example, any 
individual, entity or group who had made submission or observations during the earlier planning 
process and consultation has a right of appeal.  
6 In many Western countries, appeals are handled by regional or central boards or planning 
committees. These often involve non-government employees in order to broaden the involvement of 
diverse expertise and points of view. Such involvement in a committee or board public decision is 
significantly different from the process by which Reporters, many of whom also work as professional 
planners for developers, are singularly responsible for decision-making. The Republic of Ireland, 
which has many governance structures similar to those of the United Kingdom, has such a planning 
board (An Bord Pleanála) that decides appeals. The new legislation mentioned above will alter some 
of these dynamics in Scotland, allowing expanded right of appeal through expanding the role of the 
local boards of appeal, i.e. without expanding the power of central government.  
7 Edinburgh’s Old Town community has consistently raised concerns about ‘touristification’ – the 
ongoing erection of new hotels, conversion of family homes to short-let apartments (e.g. AirBnB)- 
and the growth in student numbers, rather than gentrification, congestion or other issues that dominate 
contestations in many city centres.  
8 Modes of inquiry typically include ‘hearings’, ‘inspection’ and ‘inquiry’.  
9 Completed in summer 2017, the housing has been named Salisbury Court. 
10 The brief stated clearly that ‘Other than a possible purely local “corner shop” facility within the 
development, perhaps as the focus of a local centre or at the seafront, no new retail provision is 
envisaged within the area’ (CEC, 2008: 3.8).  
																																								 																				
